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Verne  House  makes the case for  the classic,  formal  public policy
education  model, the model that involves  identifying options and de-
scribing  their likely  consequences.  I  have no problem with that
model as far as it goes.  Indeed, the use of the model may be vital as
a  discipline  for  practitioners  of policy  analysis.  However,  I  believe
that unless public  policy educators go beyond the confines  of that
formal  model they will fall short of their potential for engaging audi-
ences and stimulating the sort of critical thinking  that individual  cit-
izens must do to fulfill their citizenship responsibilities.
My line  of argument runs as follows:  An intellectually  honest  pol-
icy analyst who has carefully studied the issue is entitled to an in-
formed opinion,  and it strains  credibility  to deny that such  a policy
analyst does not have one.  Without credibility,  the public policy edu-
cator is doomed. Moreover,  opinions  are pedagogically useful be-
cause they engage the attention of an audience  better than a dry,
detached presentation.
This argument rests on three propositions:
The Informed Judgment Proposition
The first proposition  I  wish to advance  is that policy  analysts,  by
virtue  of their study of an issue, are  entitled to  an opinion,  or in-
formed judgment.  If an analyst  is intellectually  honest  and has done
his or her homework,  that informed judgment is itself information
for others who lack the time or skills to study issues in depth. To fail
to share these  opinions is to deprive citizens of inputs that can be
useful in the performance  of their civic responsibilities.
Such  a  proposition  is  almost heretical  for many  extension  econo-
mists. But I did a master's degree  in history. Like most graduate  stu-
dents,  those  in history  are usually  put through  a course  in meth-
odology.  My  instructor  in historiography  was Bell  Wiley,  one of the
legendary  figures  in the  study  of the  American  Civil  War.  Wiley
taught that if historians  did their job well,  they knew more about the
subject than anyone  else  and were  in a unique position  to reach  in-
formed opinions.  As scholars  they  had  an obligation  to share  those
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the subject, particularly  if their investigations were  supported out of
public  funds.
Like  historians,  professional  public  policy  specialists  immerse
themselves  in greater depth and detail in the materials  related to
public policy issues than most lay citizens can afford to do.  That is
what they  are paid to do,  often  out of public  funds.  It is to be ex-
pected that analysts  will emerge from the  immersion with certain
opinions about which of many possible  opinions is likely to be best or
at least which  are the worst choices and why.  Providing those opin-
ions are based on an intellectually  honest approach to the subject
matter,  citizens deserve the benefit of those informed opinions no
less  than the  patients  of a physician  deserve  his  or her  informed
prognosis of their condition.
The Credibility Proposition
Even if one rejects the  proposition that the  public is  entitled to
know the informed opinions  of those whom they pay to study public
policy issues, it strains  credibility for public policy educators  to pre-
tend that they do not have any opinions. An educator is worthless
without  credibility.  Being up front and open about opinions is essen-
tial  to maintaining  the  credibility  that public  policy  educators  must
have to be effective.
The audiences  which a public policy  educator must try to reach
are not made up of fools. Especially  in America, they are made up of
citizens who  seem to be  increasingly  skeptical  about the objectivity
of so-called experts. It may be very difficult for citizens to accept that
the public policy educator does not have his or her own agenda.
And why  should they not  be skeptical?  Intuitively,  lay citizens
know that few among us have the ability to be perfectly objective.
Indeed, from a philosophical perspective,  perfect  objectivity may be
impossible,  and from a practical standpoint, it is almost surely impos-
sible.  I will have more  to say on this subject in the  coda. But one
simply cannot  obtain the energy and resources  needed to identify
and  evaluate  all  possible  options.  A  whole  range  of options judged
by some standard to be infeasible  or culturally unacceptable must be
discarded as "non-starters."
Since most ordinary people, at least most that I know,  have a diffi-
cult time accepting the fact that a public policy analyst does not have
a point of view,  a pretense  of objectivity  undermines the credibility
of the public policy  educator and is counterproductive.  It can cause
audiences  simply to turn the presentation  off. It can cause members
of the audience  to be  distracted  away from the message  of the edu-
cator  as they attempt to  figure out where  the  educator  is coming
from,  what his or her hidden  agenda may  be. Better  to be up front
about one's own values, preferences  and recommendations,  with the
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being advocated is welcome  (even encouraged)  to do so.
The Pedagogic  Proposition
My final proposition is that having an explicit opinion and advocat-
ing a  specific  approach  can be  pedagogically  useful,  particularly  in
oral presentations.  There is an old story, so  familiar that it need  not
be repeated  here, about  the farmer  regularly  beginning  each  work
day by hitting a mule in the head  with a two-by-four to gets its atten-
tion.  There  is  no way to do  public policy  education unless the edu-
cator gets the audience's  attention.  Advocacy  is one  way of hitting a
potential audience in the head to get its attention.
The detached presentation  of options and ramifications can be dry
and boring.  Advocating a point of view poses a challenge to the edu-
cator to convince  and a challenge to the audience  to dispute. That
conflict between the presenter and the audience, properly managed,
introduces  passion  and  drama  into  a presentation;  and  in  a society
increasingly  conditioned by television  to demand drama, it allows
the educator  to introduce some  spice into what otherwise  is often so
bland as to be ignored.  The public policy educator who is ignored is
socially useless.
Caveats,  Qualifications,  and Conclusions
Am I arguing that the policy  educator's traditional model of op-
tions and  ramifications  be abandoned  entirely?  Certainly  not.  As  I
indicated above, use of the model as a way to discipline policy analy-
sis is very important.  For some audiences and in some types of pre-
sentations-particularly  with written materials-it remains an appro-
priate way to do public policy education.
I would agree than an intellectually honest approach to public pol-
icy education  requires  that all the major  options explicitly  be noted
and fairly considered.  Indeed, in using an advocacy approach,  there
are great advantages  to setting out the alternatives and then elim-
inating each one by one to show why the position being advocated  is
arguably the best choice among the available options.
I concede  that  some persons will be turned  off by  advocacy,  par-
ticularly if it is in support of a point of view  they find  objectionable.
But those persons often have their minds  made up anyway and they
are beyond the potential  reach of public policy educators.  I concede
as well that some  public policy educators,  by virtue of their person-
alities and  capabilities,  are  simply unsuited to practice  an  advocacy
approach to public policy education.  Regardless  of how brilliant one
may be as an analyst, if you are bland,  boring and inarticulate,  if you
are uncomfortable  with conflict or unsure of your own values,  if you
are arrogant,  humorless  or dogmatic,  the advocacy  approach is not
for you.
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late because timidity and political  cowardice  is provided respectable
cover by the tenets of logical positivism that were embraced  by
economists  a generation  or  so ago.  I  believe that by ducking our re-
sponsibility  to advocate  and  defend what  our analysis  convinces  us
to be  the best way to go,  by avoiding criticism through blandness
and the  pretense of detached  objectivity,  we  have failed  those  who
we were  supposed  to serve.  As  George  McDowell  says:  We have
told audiences what they want to hear (or told them nothing much at
all) rather than what they need  to hear, and extension  is headed for
extinction  as a result.
Advocacy in public policy education  will not save  extension,  but it
can begin to facilitate  a re-engagement  on the part of extension  with
ordinary people  who  expect those experts employed to be their ser-
vants to have the courage of their convictions, to be open and candid
in their presentations,  to defend  their positions  against vigorous  at-
tack and,  most importantly,  to be truthful, genuine  and human  in
their treatment of those who depend upon them for information.  Ad-
vocacy can put some sizzle back into our work,  and perhaps-just
perhaps-let  us reach audiences that are not now being reached.
Coda: Cultural Values  and Unexamined  Presumptions
It is important to understand that the options and consequences
model that House defends is not value neutral.  It is, in fact,  a legacy
of Progressivist ideology which,  in turn, is an offshoot of rational hu-
manism.  Rational humanism is based on the proposition that human
beings  using the rational powers  of their minds  can discover all
truth, a proposition that in itself is vehemently  rejected by many who
come out  of religious  traditions  wherein ultimate  truth is obtainable
only by divine  revelation.  The  public  choice  models  which are
offered  as an alternative to the Progressivist approach to public pol-
icy analysis  also are derived from rational  humanism approaches  to
the search for truth and share the same unexamined  presumptions.
What many  of us  innocently take as nothing more than an analyt-
ical  aid,  the  model of rational man motivated  solely by self interest,
is  taken by some  as a  subtle sanctioning  of a  culture organized
around hedonism  and materialism.  The central model of positivist
economic  analysis-methodological  individualism-is  a  cultural  af-
front to a significant segment  of American society.  In its nonjudg-
mental detachment,  it is seen as certainly amoral and godless and
sometimes dangerously  immoral.
Philosophically,  there  is no neutral ground  that a public  policy
analyst-educator  might occupy to gain a value-free perspective  on
options  and consequences.  As a practical  matter,  lack  of such neu-
tral ground mattered little so long as there was some cultural ground
common  to all segments of the society,  some  fundamental set of cul-
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much of our history, most Americans,  with the  significant exceptions
of the indigenous aboriginal  peoples and African-Americans,  shared
a cultural outlook shaped by the Judeo-Christian  civilization  of west-
ern Europe.  So  long  as  such common  ground existed,  public policy
analysis  and  education  could be  premised  upon  a consensus  about
fundamental values and achieve  neutrality within a given cultural
framework.
But it is debatable whether there  is any cultural tradition common
to all significant segments  of contemporary  American society.  The
growing populations of Asian Americans  have brought with them
cultural traditions and values drawn  from Islam, Buddhism,  Hin-
duism  and other religious  heritages  once  almost unknown  in Amer-
ica. The growing Hispanic population,  while influenced by the Chris-
tian values  of Catholicism,  has been shaped  by a culture  drawing
heavily  from Native American  and African  traditions.  Similarly,  Af-
rican-Americans  have  cultural  traditions  that  fuse  Christianity  and
African  outlooks.  Rational  humanism  cannot bridge  these  differ-
ences  because  it requires  that some  of the  most fundamental tenets
of some of these religions be rejected.
If there is no common cultural ground,  no  consensus of cultural
values,  there is no public policy analysis that, when taken apart and
examined  with  regard to  its  fundamental  presumptions,  will  not  be
controversial,  even offensive  to some  segments of the population.
Lack of such  a consensus on values has profound implications for
policy analysis  paid for by tax  monies  in a  state in which  there  is  a
constitutional  injunction  to  maintain  a  strict  separation  between
church and state.  Those  implications  are too complex  and  subtle to
be examined  properly here.  But if  all policy  analysis  must proceed
either from an outlook derived from a philosophy of rational  human-
ism, which  at least denies  a role for a supernatural  divinity, or from
an outlook derived from one of the religious traditions,  and if that
policy  analysis is officially  sanctioned  by support from tax dollars,  it
must inevitably breach  the wall of separation  of church and state.
Hence  the constitutionality  of the  very act of public policy extension
education is sooner or later likely to be questioned.
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